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I. Introduction
The past decade has witnessed sweeping changes east of what once was the iron curtain. For most
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, these changes have yielded the emergence of viable
democracies and market economies and culminated in their membership in NATO and, soon, in the
European Union. With few exceptions, the economic and political changes in  South East Europe have
so far had much less positive results. Only Slovenia and Cyprus are included in the upcoming
enlargement of the EU in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania can hope for attaining EU membership by the
end of this decade. Turkey’s status as an EU candidate country has been officially recognized, but no
date has been set for its accession. The remaining countries of the region, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro are today even less integrated
into the network of European economic and political integration. Thus, South East Europe remains a
region in search of its economic orientation and geography.
In this study, we present an overview of the economic and social developments in the region in recent
years. We focus on a comparative perspective, and we use Greece as a benchmark for the region
throughout this study. In section II, we report the basic economic and social facts and trends. In
section III, we turn to the quality of institutions in South East European countries. Section IV looks at
recent macro economic developments. In Section V we discuss recent trade and foreign direct
investment patterns and performance.
Our analysis identifies the following four main areas where policies should be pushed further to
promote competitiveness, economic growth and stability in South East Europe:
Openness to trade and foreign direct investment. Given the small size of regional markets, sustained
growth depends on trade expansion primarily with the EU and the rest of the world. Attracting foreign
investment is key to modernize the production sector. The region should focus on improving its
production structure to increase its export capacities in more growth-promising industries. Liberalizing
international capital flows will contribute to the improvement of national financial systems.
Regional cooperation. Countries in the region should coordinate their development policies to avoid
wasteful competition for foreign investment.
Strengthen governance. Good public institutions are key factors to secure sustainable growth and
attract FDI. Strengthening democracy, improving government effectiveness and the quality of market
regulations and competitive environments, and controlling corruption have positive pay-offs in terms of
growth and attracting FDI.
EU leadership. As in the case of the current EU accession countries, the prospect of future EU
membership can play a decisive role in overcoming internal resistance to reform and facilitating
institutional improvements. The EU should realize its responsibility for providing such a perspective
and exerting leadership in the region, which otherwise could remain a weak and unstable part of
Europe for too long.2
II. Economic Conditions and Perspectives:  Disparities and
Catch - up Prospects
South East Europe is a very diverse region. Consider Table 1. Cyprus will soon be one of the smallest
countries in the EU, while Turkey’s population exceeds those of France and Italy. Romania is twice the
size of Greece in terms of population size, while Bulgaria and Serbia and Montenegro are roughly of
the same size as Greece. The remaining states have populations between two and four million people,
comparable in size to Ireland. Over the past decade, population dynamics were very diverse, too.
Turkey’s and Cyprus’s populations grew at strong rates of 1.5 – 1.7 percent annually. In stark contrast,
Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Romania have suffered population losses over the
past decade, partly due to emigration. Population densities are lowest in Bulgaria and Croatia, and
highest in Albania and Serbia and Montenegro.
Table 1 indicates that Turkey has the largest GDP in the region, almost USD 200 billions. The Greek
economy amounts to 56 percent of that. All other countries in the region are much smaller than these
two. In 2000, Albania and FYR Macedonia were of almost equal economic size, reaching less than 3.5
percent of the Greek economy. Croatia and Slovenia were both of about 16 percent of the Greek
economy, Romania of about one third. These relations are quite different, however, when we look at
per-capita GDPs. To improve comparability, we use per-capita GDPs calculated in US dollars at
purchasing power parity rates rather than market exchange rates. Table 1 shows that, in terms of this
basic indicator, Slovenia and Greece have the highest standards of living in the region, with per-capita
GDPs of almost 18000 dollars annually. Slovenia with 17788 dollars, exceeds the Greek level of
17653 dollars. At the other end of the scale, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the poorest country in the
region, reaching no more than 2715 dollars, or 15 percent of the Greek level. Turkey’s per capita GDP
reaches no more than 34 percent of per-capita GDP in Greece.
Table 1 also reports the shares of agriculture and industry in GDP. Albania is still a largely agricultural
country, with almost half of its output produced in this sector. Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Turkey are more comparable on this account, with shares of agriculture between 12
and 15 percent. Slovenia and Cyprus, in contrast, have only 2.7 and 5.0 percent of GDP produced in
this sector, much less than Greece. Serbia and Montenegro have the largest share of industry in GDP.
There is a middle group of countries, led by Romania and Croatia, with shares of industry ranging
between 31 and 37 percent, while Cyprus  has only 20 percent of GDP originating in industry.
Table 2 adds further development indicators to this picture. The low shares of urban in total
populations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro underscore the
importance of the agricultural sector in these countries. Life expectancy remains low except in Greece,
Cyprus and Slovenia. Adult literacy is quite high, the only exceptions being Albania and Turkey, where
it reaches only 85%. However, school enrolment is low in several countries. Only Greece and Slovenia
have enrolment rates above 80 percent; Turkey has the lowest rate with merely 62 percent, while the
other countries reach enrolment rates around 70 percent. Despite the relatively high literacy rates, the3
enrolment rates indicate a rather poor level of education in most countries of the region. A low level of
education of the workforce thus remains an obstacle to sustained growth.
Finally, this table also reports the human development index published by the UN Development
Program (UNDP), a summary statistic of human development including economic, social, health, and
environmental conditions.
1 Greece, Cyprus, and Slovenia have practically the same scores on this
index; as a result, they rank numbers 24, 26, and 29 respectively on a world-wide scale. At the lower
end of the spectrum, Albania has the lowest index value and ranks number 92 worldwide. Turkey is
the next lowest on this measure, ranking number 85 worldwide. Again, the table underscores the
diversity of economic development conditions in the region, reaching from middle-income countries
such as Greece, Cyprus, and Slovenia, to low-income countries like Albania and Turkey.
Explaining the differences in levels of economic development gives a hint at the economic policies
countries in the region should pursue for sustained growth. A first suggestion might be that economic
development hinges on moving factors of production from agriculture to industry. As it turns out, the
correlation between the share of agriculture in GDP and per-capita income in the region is indeed
strongly negative, as expected; see Chart 1.
2 Yet, the correlation between the share of industry in
GDP and per-capita GDP is also negative.. This probably indicates the legacy of outdated industrial
structures in many countries in the region, which we also find reflected in the trade structure of several
countries, as will be discussed below. Thus, expanding industry per se is not a promising strategy
for the region, what matters as much is to develop a more modern and internationally
competitive industrial sector. At the same time, we find that there is a significant positive correlation
between the levels of per-capita GDP and the share of the remaining sectors (services, construction,
etc) in GDP. This again hints at the importance of developing more modern production structures to
achieve higher levels of economic welfare.
Table 2 reports the EBRD indicators of infrastructure reform for the South East European countries.
3
The high scores for Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia clearly reflect the results of a decade of pre-
accession assistance from the EU. These countries have reached infrastructure endowments that are
not far from EU levels and quality. Croatia equals Bulgaria, although it is not among the candidates
for EU membership. The other countries are marked by much lower infrastructure quality, which can
be an impediment to economic development and trade in particular. Low levels of infrastructure
quality thus contribute to the low level of economic development in most countries in the
region. This indicates a need for significant public sector investments in these countries in
future years.
                                                       
1 HDI scores are between 0 and 1. According to UNDP (2002), South East Asia and the Pacific Region have
scores of 0.69, and Latin America and the Caribbean have scores of  0.76.
2 In this and the following charts, the R
2 gives the statistical coefficient of determination of the trend line shown in
the graphs. As the squared correlation coefficient, it indicates the strength of the correlation.
3 These data are not available for Turkey, Cyprus, nor Greece. Higher values indicate better infrastructure
development, the maximum score is 4+, a value assigned to a fully functioning market economy.4
Openness to the international economy is another important factor in explaining the differences in
economic development in the region. Chart 2 makes the point by plotting the share of exports in GDP
together with the level of per-capita GDP. Bulgaria is a bit exceptional in this graph given its very large
export share and its yet less advanced level of economic development. Nevertheless, the graph
illustrates the importance of an outward-orientation to achieve economic improvement for the
countries of the region. Below, we show that the predominant trade orientation of the regional
economies is towards the EU. A noteworthy corollary of this is that the region never developed much
of an internal market in the past 50 years, although several of the countries belonged to the same
state. The reason for this is that domestic demand was not  sufficiently large for sustained growth.
Today, the implication is that a regional development strategy must be one based on trade with the
rest of Europe rather than developing a regional market of its own. Given the small size of most of the
economies, counting on the regional market development for  growth prospects bears the risk of
detrimental competition of national development policies. One example for this would be the
duplication of infrastructure projects. Another example is that countries might engage in tax
competition – or competition in tax relieves – trying to attract the same international investors to build
new production facilities. Such competition is useful to the extent that it promotes public sector
discipline and effectiveness, but it can be economically wasteful. If potential investors from abroad
have bargaining power over governments in the region, they can demand that infrastructure
supporting their investments be put in place as part of the bidding process. This can lead to excess
infrastructure investment at the regional level, since only one country wins the bid for the investor.
Similarly, competition can induce a race to the bottom in the taxation of international investors. To
promote efficiency and avoid waste of public resources, a balance ought to be struck between these
two opposing forces. One way to achieve this – practiced, for example, by the states bordering the
Great Lakes in the US – is to establish a common development council for the region, through which
governments exchange information about their dealing with foreign investors and arrange cooperation
in specific infrastructure and development projects to coordinate and avoid costly duplication. If, as in
the case of the Great Lakes, such cooperation is strictly voluntary in the sense that no government
can be forced by others to invest resources in common projects, the risk of wasteful public
investments is minimized.
Greater economic openness and international integration can also contribute to mitigating ethnic
tensions in the region. To reduce and eliminate the risk of ethnic conflicts, countries in South East
Europe need unambiguous prospects for economic and political integration in European and trans-
Atlantic institutions conditioned on respecting human rights including those of ethnic minorities. This
integration policy has worked well in the cases of two EU accession countries, Estonia and Latvia,
where ethnic discrimination and tensions were high at the beginning of the last decade.
Tensions resulting from ethnic divisions can impede democratic and economic development in the
region, for example, if ethnic discrimination in the labor markets keeps countries from making full use
of their labor forces. But it is important to recognize that this is not necessarily the case. Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia, three of the countries with the most positive transition experiences in the past
decade are characterized by very strong ethnic divisions that were regarded as potentially damaging5
for their development in the early 1990s. All three are today front-running  EU acceding countries. One
of the most important lessons that can be learned by the South East European countries from the
Baltic experiences is probably that a determined political and economic orientation towards Western
Europe can be helpful in mitigating conflicts from ethnic divisions. Overcoming problems with ethnic
discrimination in the labor market and other social institutions was an explicit condition for these
countries to be considered as serious applicants for EU membership. At the same time, this suggests
a role for the EU in attaining peaceful development in the region by providing assistance and, perhaps
most importantly, a perspective for the countries’ economic and political future
III. Institutional Development and Economic Performance
In recent years, economists and policy makers have increasingly recognized the importance of good
government institutions, governance for short, for strong and sustainable economic development.
Governance determines the conditions under which economic transactions evolve, business contracts
are made, and commitments to invest capital are entered into. Institutions determine the “rules of the
game” for economic actors and for political actors dividing solutions to economic and social conflicts.
Good institutions reduce economic uncertainty, increase the predictability of the outcomes of
economic choices such as saving and investment, and generally increase efficiency. In doing so, good
institutions can increase the willingness of businesses and workers to accept structural reforms
instead of defending their positions and privileges inherited from the past. Strong political participation
and accountability assure that government provides the services that the citizens need. Government
effectiveness and good quality regulation increase the transparency of markets and improve and
intensify competition in the economy. Keeping a check on corruption assures greater transparency of
policy choices and a more level playing field for all competitors. Kaufmann et al. (2002) present an
extensive database that allows international comparisons in this regard. They look at governance in
six dimensions, voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
4 The data are based on surveys and polls conducted in
1997-98 and in 2000-01. Governance indicators are defined for values between –2.5 and 2.5, higher
values indicate better institutions. Table 3 reports these data for the South-East European countries.
Here, too, Cyprus, Greece, and Slovenia are the leading countries. They stand out for relatively strong
democratic institutions, relatively high political stability, effective government and good quality of
regulations. Slovenia and Cyprus both reach considerably higher scores even than Greece in terms of
rule of law and corruption control. In the remaining countries, lack of government effectiveness, low
quality of economic regulations, weak rule of law and high levels of corruption indicate a situation of
poor governance, that renders business conditions unfavorable and works against the emergence of a
                                                       
4 Voice and accountability refers to the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of their governments.
Political stability indicates perceptions of the likelihood that a government will be overthrown by unconstitutional
means. Government effectiveness refers to the perceptions of the quality of the bureaucracy and public service
provision, while regulatory quality measures the quality of regulatory policies in terms of market friendliness and
regulatory burden. Rule of law indicates the extent to which agents have confidence in the rules of society and
control of corruption measures the perception of how prevalent corruption is in society. See Kaufmann et al
(2002).6
market economy. Democratic institutions have improved over the past five years, but remain weak
compared with advanced economies . Between 1997/98 and 2000/01, political stability has improved
in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey, but weakened in Croatia,
Bulgaria, and Romania. In the latter three countries, political stability has improved since 2001.
5 Apart
from the leading group, all countries in the region still face the need for strong efforts to build the
institutional foundations of modern economies and societies. The importance of developing better
institutions of governance in the South East European region is illustrated by linking the development
and the institutional data from the countries. In chart 3, we show the correlation between the level of
economic development, measured in terms of per capita GDP, and institutional quality in terms of the
measure for voice and accountability. The correlation is strongly positive, showing that better
institutions are typically paired with higher per-capita incomes. As noted above, the simple correlation
can be interpreted in both directions. Still, the experience of the institutional improvements in the EU
candidate countries and their economic performance during the 1990s suggest that it is likely that
developing good institutions improves economic performance, and this conclusion is supported by
much of the recent research in the area.
6 Charts 4 and 5 corroborate that view. Here, we show the
correlation between the average growth rate of real GDP during 1997 – 2001 together with two
important aspects of institutional development, i.e., the quality of regulatory regimes and the
effectiveness of corruption control. Since Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina had exceptionally high
growth rates in some of these years due to the post-war recoveries, we do not include these two.
7 The
figures show strong positive associations of economic growth and institutional quality in the region.
This indicates that efforts to improve the quality of the public sector including legislation and
administration is another important element of a sustainable economic development strategy for South
East Europe. Here, it is important to point to a potential role for the EU. The political acceptability of
institutional reform is likely to be greater when those who give up significant powers can expect to be
compensated and rewarded, be it by greater political support in other areas, be it by greater overall
economic success of the country. In both aspects, a realistic perspective for achieving closer links
with, and, ultimately, membership in the EU could be an important stimulus for institutional reforms in
the region. Clearly, the region’s interest in obtaining such a perspective must be balanced by the EU’s
legitimate interest in avoiding economic turmoil that could result from admitting economies which are
not yet mature for full membership. But the experience of the 1990s suggests that the process and
speed of maturing depends itself on the expectation that membership can be attained. Setting clear
targets and procedures for achieving membership, and involving the countries in visible forms of
dialogue with the EU in the same way as the EU did for the current candidates is indispensable to
speed up institutional and economic improvements in the region.
Table 4 reports a number of indicators of the development of financial institutions in the region.
Monetization of the economy, measured in terms of the ratio of broad money to GDP is still very low,
                                                       
5 See the assessments in the country reports by the European Commission (2002, 2003a).
6 See IMF, World Economic Outlook 2003 for a survey.
7 The correlations vanish when these two are included.7
Cyprus being the only exception. Serbia and Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Turkey
show particularly low levels of monetization, with the ratio of broad money to GDP 17, 19, 24 and 25
percent, respectively. To compare, the average ratio for the euro area is 70 percent. The low value
indicates that banking institutions remain severely underdeveloped. In many countries, the
government still owns significant parts of the banking system indicating a lack of competition in this
sector. At the same time, banking systems are plagued with large shares of non-performing loans.
This is a problem especially in FYR Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, but also in Croatia and
Turkey. The EBRD index of financial banking reform reaches satisfactory values only in Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bulgaria. It remains particularly low in Serbia and Montenegro. A significant result of the
weakness of the banking sectors is the low level of financial intermediation, indicated by the low ratios
of credit to the private sector. It indicates that the lack of access to financial resources is an important
impediment to the development of the private sector. The corresponding number for the euro area is
110 percent. Similarly, non-banking financial institutions remain weak. Where such data exist, the
stock market capitalization points to the fact that equity markets are small. Apart from Croatia, the
EBRD index of non-bank financial institutions is generally low in the region.
Apart from Turkey, the South - East European economies are likely to be too small to develop efficient
financial institutions and markets on their own. Access to and supply of foreign capital is a viable
alternative to improve the economy’s provision with financial resources. Following the example of
several EU accession countries in recent years, governments in the region should consider allowing
foreign financial institutions to enter their domestic markets by buying domestic banks and their
subsidiaries. This can help increase the efficiency of financial intermediation by bringing in know-how.
At the same time, it gives domestic institutions greater financial stability. For foreign banks, entering
markets in this way can be attractive as it saves the costs of building up customer relations especially
on the depositor side. Obviously, opening up the financial system to international participation requires
the removal of capital controls and the introduction of modern, market friendly financial regulation.
Foreign investors have contributed positively to intensifying competition and improving efficiency in the
financial sector in Central European countries where they own more than two thirds of the banking
system ( Caviglia, Krause, and Thimann; Ickes, von Hagen, and Traistaru, 2002).
IV. Macroeconomic Stability: Successes and Risks
Macro economic performance has been very disparate in the region in recent years, as some
countries struggled through post-war periods and others like Turkey suffered currency crises. Table 5
gives an overview. A striking impression from that table is that the region today falls into two groups,
one, for which successful macro economic stabilization could become an asset in attracting foreign
investment in the future, and one which still suffers from more severe macro economic instability.
As shown in Table 5, seven of the 10 South East European countries achieved single-digit average
inflation rates in the period from 1999 – 2001, four of them had inflation rates below five percent on
average. This group contains Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria,
Slovenia, and Cyprus. Note that Slovenia, though most advanced in terms of EU membership, had the8
highest average inflation rate in this group. Inflation picked up somewhat in Albania during 2002, but
remained stable or came down in the other countries of this group. These data indicate a strong
commitment to monetary stability in these countries.
The other group of countries, consisting of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey, shows the
effects of large macro economic imbalances during this period. Between 1997 and 2001, average
inflation was 42 percent, 61 percent and 58 percent annually, respectively. All three countries
achieved significant stabilization by 2002, but inflation remain well in the double-digits. Thus,
stabilization remains a principal policy concern in these countries.
The commitment to macro economic stability seems to have had some positive pay-off in terms of
stable and healthy economic growth. During the period 1997-2001, Albania and Bosnia and
Herzegovina had the highest real growth rate, 6.5 percent annual average, which may be upward
biased by the effects of a post-war recovery. Slovenia, Albania, Cyprus, and Croatia had the strongest
growth performance among the other countries, 4.5, 4.4, 4.2, and 3.4 percent annual averages
respectively . In contrast, the more unstable countries, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey,
had much lower average growth during this period. Chart 6 makes the point. It shows the strong,
negative relationship between the average rate of inflation (1999-2001) and the average real growth
rate (1997-2001).
Table 5 also indicates that the region’s growth performance was quite robust in 2002, despite the
economic slowdown in the world economy. Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and
Slovenia experienced somewhat lower real growth in 2002 compared to the average of the preceding
five years, but Turkey and Romania improved considerably.
Successful macro economic stability has largely been achieved by stabilizing exchange rates. Official
exchange rate regimes vary across countries in the region. Albania, Croatia,  Serbia and Montenegro,
Romania, and Slovenia apply managed floats, FYR Macedonia has a fixed exchange rate tied to the
euro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria both maintain currency boards with the euro as anchor
currency. As indicated in Table 6, however, exchange rate variability has been very low among the
countries that achieved high degrees of macro economic stability, even if their official exchange rate
regimes admit more flexibility. Average rates of change in euro exchange rates were very small in this
group, as were the standard deviations of exchange rates. This is in line with the common perception
that the exchange rate is the best nominal anchor for small, open economies. Note, however, Bulgaria
and Slovenia, both countries with very stable exchange rates had among the highest inflation rates in
that group. For fast-growing Slovenia in particular, this might be prima facie evidence of the Balassa
Samuelson effect that predicts higher CPI inflation for countries pegging their exchange rates while
enjoying faster productivity growth in their tradables industries than for the country whose currency
they peg to. The policy implication is that the macro economic goals of low inflation and high
productivity growth can be conflicting under fixed-exchange regimes. This could become a relevant
point in a future choice of monetary strategy for joining the euro area. Since countries joining the euro
area must not have inflation rates that are too high compared to the euro, they could be forced to give9
up the fixed exchange rate to hold inflation down.
8 Alternatively, they might move to full-blown
currency boards with the euro, to preserve the improve of the fixed exchange rate.
Adopting currency boards with the euro is an attractive option, for the small countries in the region at
least, for another consideration. Above, we have pointed out that the countries should consider
opening their banking systems to foreign banks to improve their economies’ access to credit. Such a
move would require liberalizing international capital flows, which in turn, endangers the sustainability
of pegged exchange rate systems. When fixed exchange rates come under speculative attacks,
capital controls are often the only defense the central banks have left to avoid currency crises. Since
exposure of traditional managed floats to speculative attacks is particularly large, moving to a currency
board can be a viable strategy to reduce the risk of currency crises. Of course, moving to a currency
board forces a country to virtually give up its monetary policy autonomy. But the value of such
autonomy is small for small open economies, anyway, since domestic monetary policy has little control
over domestic output and prices (Begg et al., 2003). Thus, currency boards should be attractive
arrangements for those countries in the region which do not already practice them today, as they
combine greater macro economic stability with the opportunity to attract foreign banks and capital.
A number of risks to macro economic stability lurk behind this broader picture. One is the persistent
and high level of unemployment in the region (see Table 5). Official unemployment rates are
extremely high Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. But
even where official rates are lower, the employment index, which compares employment in 2001 to
employment in 1989 and, thus, illustrates the extent of job destruction in the transition process, shows
that employment is generally low in the region. In fact, Cyprus is the only country that enjoyed
significant job creation over the last decade. Employment growth was low even in Greece and Turkey,
which are not transition economies. Creating new jobs must be a priority of economic policies in
these countries in particular. Political pressures might arise otherwise that turn governments
to using inflationary policies in efforts to overcome the problem.
A second risk to macro economic stability arises from the external sector in some countries. Table 6
shows that several countries in the region experienced very sizeable current account deficits recently.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro received very
sizeable remittances from emigrant workers and significant amounts of international financial aid in
recent years, which offset part of these deficits. In 2000, some of the economies in South East
Europe show a large aid dependence. Thus, Albania received international assistance amounting to
8.5 percent of  GDP, FYR Macedonia 7.6 percent of GDP, Serbia and Montenegro 13.4 percent of
GDP, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 17.6 percent of GDP. But these sources of financing are not
sustainable in the long run.  Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia and Montenegro have very heavy burdens of
external debt, making their external performance more precarious.
A third risk factor comes from the lack of fiscal discipline in some countries, see Table 7. Turkey
stands out for its huge fiscal deficit in 2001 and the years before, and its high public debt. Both add to
                                                       
8 See Begg et al. (2003) for a discussion.10
the macro economic instability of the country. Though much smaller, large fiscal deficits are also a
reason for concern in Albania, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. In the first two of these, the
problem has been going on for some time, as indicated by the averages for 1999-2001 shown in Table
7. Public debt burdens seem rather large already in Albania, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro,
indicating that there is not much room left for allowing deficits to persist. Achieving greater fiscal
discipline is a principal policy requirement in these countries. The experience from other countries
suggests that improving fiscal institutions, i.e. the rules of budget making and administration, and
increasing fiscal transparency is one important approach to achieve this goal (von Hagen and Harden,
1995; Gleich, 2002).
Public services including welfare systems are not yet developed according to modern standards in
these countries. Public spending on education and health is generally low, amounting to no more and
often much less than six percent of GDP in the region. Only Croatia (9.5 percent of GDP) and
Slovenia (6.7 percent of GDP) had higher health expenditures in 2001. Education and social reforms
that are necessary to promote the development of sustainable market economies will put additional
pressures on future budgets and force governments to cut spending elsewhere to avoid expansions of
public spending to unsustainable levels. During the 1990s, the ratio of government spending to GDP
has converged to rates around 40 percent in most EU accession states (von Hagen and Gleich, 2001).
Taking this rate as a benchmark suggests that there is considerable room for reducing
expenditures in Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, which would help
assuring macro economic stability and free public resources for the required spending
adjustments. Other countries will have to rely more on finding additional and new sources of
tax revenues both to secure fiscal stability and to finance new demands on the public sector.
V. Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Performance
The recent improvement of the economic climate in the region following the stabilization and reform
process has contributed to the expansion of trade and foreign direct investment although it has been
uneven across countries. In most South East European countries export growth has been the main
engine for GDP growth in recent years. Chart 7 shows the positive correlation between export growth
and real GDP growth.
 Trade Liberalization
South East European countries have generally liberal and open trade systems (see Table 8). Nine of
these countries are members of the WTO while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro
have requested WTO membership in 1999 and 2001 respectively. All countries have preferential trade
agreements with the European Union (EU) and a network of intra-regional bilateral free trade
agreements. Cyprus and Turkey have had custom unions with the EU since 1973 and 1996
respectively. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia have gradually liberalized their trade with the EU via11
the Europe Agreements
9. Cyprus and Slovenia are to become EU members in 2004 and Bulgaria and
Romania are expected to join the EU in 2007. Croatia applied formally for EU membership in February
2003. The five countries of the Western Balkans group
10 have been benefiting from duty free access
to EU market for almost all goods (with particular conditions for certain textile and agricultural
products) via a set of autonomous trade measures (ATMs) granted unilaterally by the EU in
September 2000
11. Furthermore, the EU has signed Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA)
with FYR Macedonia and Croatia providing for progressive reciprocal free trade of goods.  SAA
negotiations have started with Albania at the beginning of 2003 and are under examination in the
cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.
Intra-regional trade liberalization and trade cooperation have been facilitated through regional free
trade agreements such as CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement)
12 and bilateral free trade
agreements concluded in the framework of the Stability Pact
13. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and
Slovenia are members of CEFTA. A network of 21 bilateral free trade agreements have been
negotiated as part of the Trade Initiative of the Stability Pact
14 amongst Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro
15.  A free trade
area in South East Europe is planned to be fully in force starting with July 2003. Yet, the experience
with CEFTA, and the existing trade and specialization patterns suggest that its potential in generating
intra-regional trade will be limited given the small size of the regional market and very similar
comparative advantages, as will be shown below.  One important implication of the progressive trade
liberalization is that it will diminish the governments’ customs revenues. This loss will require
compensation through the widening of the tax base and the development of new taxes.
                                                       
9 The Europe Agreements established a framework for bilateral political dialog and economic co-operation
between Central and Eastern European countries and the European Union. They include measures for the
progressive trade liberalization with industrial products. Protocols on rules of origin provide for a diagonal
cumulation of origin on industrial products between the EU, the EFTA countries, the CEECs and Turkey.
Protocols on reciprocal tariff concessions on agricultural products entered into force on 1 July 2000 with all
CEECs except Poland with whom it entered into force on 1 January 2001(World Trade Organisation , European
Union Trade Policy Review 2002).
10 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.
Since 1999 Kosovo is under  the special mandate of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), based on  the UN
Security Council Resolution 1244.
11 Applicable until 31 December 2005 based on  Council Regulation No.2007/2000 (European Commission,
2003a)
12 CEFTA was initially signed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on 21 December 1992. Slovenia,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia subsequently joined.
13 The Stability Pact was launched in June 1999 by an EU initiative. It is a political declaration of commitment and
a framework agreement on international co-operation to develop a long term strategy for stability and growth in
South East Europe. Information about the activities of the Stability Pact can be found at
http://www.stabilitypact.org
14 the basis for these free trade agreements is the Memorandum on Trade Liberalization and Facilitation signed
on 27 June 2001 in the framework of the Stability Pact
15 10 agreements are in force and 11 agreements are in the process of ratification. Moldova has associated itself
to the Pact with an extended timetable12
Trade Performance
Overall, the region accounts for a small share of world total trade. In 2001, the region’s exports of
goods represented 1.2 percent and imports 2.0 percent of the world totals respectively. The largest
trading countries in the region are Turkey, Romania, Slovenia and Greece.  These four countries in
2001 accounted for 79 percent of the region’s total exports (see Chart 8).
The EU is the main destination of exports from South East European countries (see Chart 9.) In 2001,
the share of exports to the EU in total exports was above two thirds in Albania, Serbia and
Montenegro, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. The share of exports to the other
countries in the region was relatively high, 44 percent, in FYR Macedonia and around one quarter in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. Intra – regional exports
accounted for smaller shares in the total exports of the remaining countries.  The dependence on the
EU markets for exports could negatively affect the prospects for export growth should the EU continue
to grow slowly. To keep exports growing, South East European countries must rely on
improving competitiveness or regional diversification.
The EU is also the main origin of imports with the exceptions of Cyprus and Turkey where the share of
imports from the rest of the world is higher (see Chart 10). Intra-regional imports account for a
small share in the total imports of South East European countries. Only three countries, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro have imports from the other countries
in the region above one quarter.
Labor-intensive products make up the largest part of exports for all countries with the exception of
Slovenia (Chart 11). Slovenia and Croatia have relatively high shares of capital intensive product
exports. Capital intensive and labor intensive products represent the bulk of imports in South East
European countries with capital intensive products more than one third of imports. This trade structure
reflects inter-industry specialization patterns typical for developing countries in their exchanges with
more advanced economies. The examples of Slovenia and Croatia suggest that switching to more
advanced specialization structures requires product quality upgrading in technologically more
advanced branches
16.
The comparative advantages of countries in South East Europe are to a large extent overlapping (see
Table 9). The same three sectors ranked by the revealed comparative advantage index (RCA)
17
appear among  the five highest ranked sectors in eight out of the eleven countries: Leather products
(all countries, except Slovenia, Turkey, Greece); Clothing (in all countries, except, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia); and Basic manufactures (in all countries, except
Croatia, Cyprus, Slovenia). Chemicals are among the five sectors with the highest RCA in six
countries (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovenia, Greece), as well as Wood
products (in all five countries of the Western Balkans). Another three sectors from the labour intensive
                                                       
16 see Landesmann and Stehrer (2002) for a more detailed discussion on the potential for switching to more
advanced specialization patterns in catching –up economies
17 The revealed comparative advantage is calculated as the ratio of the product group share in national exports to
its share in the world exports.13
category are present in four countries: Miscellaneous manufacturing (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cyprus, and Slovenia), Textiles (Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Turkey and
Greece), and Processed food (FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Cyprus, Greece). Capital
intensive products are among the five sectors with the highest RCA only in a few countries: Non-
electronic machinery ( Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania), IT & Consumer electronics (Romania and
Turkey), Transport equipment (Croatia, and Turkey), Electronic components (Slovenia).
This analysis indicates that the South East European countries compete in the same external markets
and do so with developing countries having similar comparative advantages. Given the low growth
potential of those external markets due to low income elasticities of demand in the export markets,
development strategies should focus on better production structures and differentiated
products.
Foreign Direct Investment
FDI inflows in South East Europe in 2001 represented 1.3 percent of the world’s inward FDI. The
UNCTAD FDI performance index
18 and Inward FDI Potential Index
19 (Table 11), suggest that Bulgaria
and Croatia are performing best in terms of their FDI performance while Slovenia, Cyprus, and Greece
are the best placed in terms of inward FDI potential. In recent years, FDI inflows were stimulated
by privatization, so they could slow down if economic reforms do not continue. Per capita FDI
inflows were particularly high in Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus, and were comparable
with the size of per capita FDI inflows in two advanced transition economies, Hungary and Poland.
Greece and Bulgaria performed better than the regional average  while Albania, Turkey, Romania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro fell below the region’s average (Chart 12). FDI
inflows were also positively related to the inward FDI stocks in 2001 (see Chart 13) suggesting that
initial conditions and previous performance matter for future FDI inflows. This result implies a
successful “demonstration effect” of first movers in attracting subsequent investors in the region.
The macro economic importance of FDI for the region is underscored by the fact that FDI inflows are
positively correlated with export growth, see Chart 14. Countries with high levels of FDI inflows are
those with relatively high per-capita exports, while low per-capita exports come with low FDI inflows.
This suggests that foreign investors are particularly attracted by opportunities to produce
export goods in South East Europe, i.e. to use the relative production cost advantages of the
region. Given the importance of export growth for real GDP growth in the region, this means that
attracting FDI is an important element of a strategy for sustained growth.
Foreign investors entering a country to produce export goods are likely to take the institutional quality
of the host country as a particularly important factor in their decisions. As indicated above, institutional
                                                       
18 The inward FDI performance index is calculated as the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI flows to its share
in global GDP (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2002)
19 The inward FDI potential index is an unweighted average of the scores of eight normalized economic and social
variables including: the rate of growth of GDP; per capita GDP; share of exports in GDP; telephone lines per
1,000 inhabitants; commercial energy use per capita; share of R&D expenditures in gross national income; share
of tertiary students in the population; country risk  (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2002)14
quality determines the quality of the business environment and reduces the uncertainty of economic
choices. This makes the institutional quality of the host country an important element in the
competition for foreign direct investment. Charts 15-17 corroborate this reasoning. Here, we use three
institutional indexes from Table 3: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and corruption control.
FDI stocks show strong positive correlations with all three. This again points to the importance of
improving the institutional environment of the South East European countries to support and promote
their economic development.  An example of improved institutional quality and superior economic
performance is Estonia which has achieved a regulatory quality similar to more advanced economies
such as Denmark and Germany and has been recently successful in attracting foreign investment and
achieving high growth rates.15
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Annex: Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators
















Albania 3.4 - 0.6 120 3752 3720 49.1 27.3 23.6
Bosnia and
Herzegovina




Bulgaria 8.1 - 0.9 73 11995 5607 13.7 28.4 57.9
Croatia 4.4  0.3 77 19031 7854 8.3 32.3 59.5
Cyprus 0.8 1.5 82 8698 11543 5.0 20.0 75.0






10.6 0.4 104 8449 3532 25.1 38.2 36.7
Romania 22.4 - 0.4 94 36719 6973 12.4 37.1 50.6
Slovenia 2.0 0.4 98 18129 17788 2.7 27.4 59.1
Turkey 66.2 1.7 85 199937 6021 15.2 26.6 58.3




Notes: a) 1998; b) 1999
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002)18




















Albania 42.9 74.0 84.7 71.0 0.73 2.0
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
43.4 74.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0
Bulgaria 67.5 71.6 98.4 72.0 0.78 2.7
Croatia 58.1 73.3. 98.3 68.0 0.81 2.7
Cyprus 69.9 77.9 97.1 68.0 0.88 n.a.
FYR Macedonia 59.5 72.8 94.0 70.0 0.77 2.0
Serbia and
Montenegro
51.7 72.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0
Romania 55.3 69.9 98.1 69.0 0.78 3.0
Slovenia 49.2 75.3 99.6 83.0 0.88 3.0
Turkey 65.8 69.8 85.1 62.0 0.74 n.a.
Greece 60.6 78.2 97.2 81.0 0.89 n.a.
Notes: a) percent of population age 15 and above
           b) Combined gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment (1999)
Source: EBRD (2001, 2002); World Bank; UNDP Human Development Report (2002)19
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Share of Agriculture Share of Industry Others
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for
Europe (2002)20
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Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for
Europe(2002)21





Regulatory quality Rule of Law Corruption
2000/01 19997/9
8
2000/01 1997/98 2000/01 1997/98 2000/01 1997/98 2000/01 1997/98 2000/01 1997/98
Albania 0.01 - 0.13 - 0.60 - 1.00 - 0.89 - 0.65 - 0.21 - 0.70 - 0.71 - 0.92 - 0.60 - 0.99
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
- 0.29 - 1.00 - 0.01 - 1.16 - 0.92 - 1.11 - 1.18 - 1.26 - 0.75 -1.11 - 0.49 - 0.35
Bulgaria 0.59 0.47 0.37 0.43 - 0.26 - 0.81 0.16 0.52 0.02 - 0.15 - 0.16 - 0.56
Croatia 0.48 - 0.23 0.18 0.41 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.15 0.02 - 0.46
Cyprus 1.28 1.11 0.48 0.38 0.91 1.04 0.83 0.84 0.96 0.93 1.24 1.81
FYR Macedonia 0.03 0.09 - 1.45 - 0.4 - 0.63 - 0.58 - 0.23 - 0.31 - 0.33 - 0.26 - 0.51 - 0.52
Serbia and
Montenegro
- 0.09 - 0.71 - 0.48 - 1.42 - 0.97 - 0.95 - 0.70 - 1.54 - 0.94 - 0.81 - 1.04 - 0.99
Romania 0.50 0.29 - 0.08 0.02 - 0.54 - 0.57 - 0.28 0.20 - 0.02 - 0.09 - 0.51 - 0.46
Slovenia 1.07 1.03 0.87 1.09 0.70 0.57 0.52 0.53 0.89 0.83 1.09 1.02
Turkey - 0.55 - 0.88 - 0.75 - 0.94 - 0.15 - 0.41 0.04 0.59 - 0.16 - 0.01 - 0.48 - 0.35
Greece 1.12 1.05 0.79 0.21 0.65 0.56 0.71 0.60 0.62 0.50 0.73 0.82
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002)22
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Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for
Europe (2002); Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002)
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Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002); European Commission (2002, 2003); IMF, World Economic
Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations23




















































Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002); European Commission (2002, 2003); IMF, World Economic
Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations24



























Albania 62.1 4.0 59.2 n.a. 6.9 2.3 2.0
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
47.0 2.2 8.9 n.a. 7.0 2.3 1.0
Bulgaria 40.9 14.6 19.9 3.7 7.9 3.0 2.0
Croatia 76.9 24.5 3.8 15.4 13.7 3.7 3.0
Cyprus 125.2 125.0 4.2 n.a. 9.4
FYR Macedonia 19.0 12.5 1.3 0.4 24.7 3.0 1.7
Serbia and
Montenegro
16.9 6.0 68.0 .. 24.4 1.0 1.0
Romania 24.0 8.0 45.4 6.0 3.4 2.7 2.0
Slovenia 63.0 40.4 48.4 15.3 9.2 3.3 2.7
Turkey 25.0 16.9 31.6 12.9
Greece 73.1 
a),.b) 38.4 
b) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: a) M3; b) 2000
Source: EBRD (2002); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); European Commission (2002); IMF (2002); authors’ calculations25



















Albania 5.4 1.2 4.7 4.4 14.6 80.3
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
0.0 0.7 3.8 6.5 40.4 74.2
Bulgaria 5.9 5.9 4.5 2.0 19.5 37.9
Croatia 2.4 5.1 5.2 3.4 15.8 67.4
Cyprus 2.8 2.7 2.0 4.2 4.0 114.5
FYR Macedonia 2.4 3.4 0.0 1.8 30.5 60.3
Serbia and
Montenegro
21.4 61.4 4.0 1.2 27.5 80.2
Romania 22.5 42.3 4.9 - 1.0 8.6 78.8 
a)
Slovenia 7.5 7.8 2.9 4.5 5.9 83.9
Turkey 54.4 58.0 6.7 1.0 8.5 108.7
Greece 3.9 3.1 4.0 3.7 10.5 106.9
Note: a) 2000
Source: European Commission (2002,2003a); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002), UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations26










-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
































Sources: European Commission (2002, 2003); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002); UN Economic
Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations27









Euro Exchange Rate 
b)
(%, 1997 – 2002)
Current Account
Balance
(% of GDP, 2001)
Albania - 4.8 12.8 - 6.3
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
- 2.4 4.6 - 22.3
Bulgaria 0.7 1.4 - 6.2
Croatia 1.2 3.3 - 3.1
Cyprus - 0.2 - 4.3
FYR Macedonia 1.0 3.0 - 10.6
Serbia and
Montenegro
56.8 83.4 - 5.5
Romania 30.9 48.4 - 5.9
Slovenia 4.6 8.9 - 0.4
Turkey 52.7 73.4 2.3
Greece - 0.4 4.4 - 4.0 
a)
Note: a) 1999, b) based on annual average rates
Source:  European Commission (2002, 2003a); EBRD (2003); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); author's
calculations28
Table 7: Fiscal Indicators
General
Government
Balance (% of GDP)
2002
General Government
Balance (% of GDP)
Average 1999 – 2001
General
Government Debt






Albania - 7.5 - 9.7 64.4 31.0
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
- 4.1 - 8.3 46.8 
a) 56.0
Bulgaria - 0.8 - 0.3 54.5 38.9
Croatia - 6.2 - 6.7 57.5 51.5
Cyprus - 3.5 - 3.2 54.6 
c) 38.2 
d)




- 5.7 - 1.1 
b) 77.0 
a) 48.7
Romania - 2.7 - 3.6 29.8 33.6
Slovenia - 2.9 - 1.1 29.0 43.5
Turkey - 28.4 
c) - 17.7 102.5 
c) 43.2 
d)
Greece - 1.3 - 1.6 105.8 47.7
Note: a) external debt b) 200-2001 c) 2001 d) Central Government, 2001
Source: EBRD (2003); European Commission (2003a); European Commission (2002), IMF (2003a)Table 8: Free Trade Agreements in South - East Europe, as of January 2003
  WTO accession and Status EU relations Free Trade Agreements(FTAs)
Albania 2000   FTAs under the Stability Pact
    ATMs September 2000  
    SAA negotiations started 2003  
Bosnia and
Herzegovina accession requested 1999 ATMs 1997 and September 2000 FTAs under the Stability Pact
    Road Map for SAA  
Croatia 2000 ATMs September 2000 CEFTA, 1 January 2003, FTA with EFTA
    SAA signed October 2001 FTAs under the Stability Pact
    Interim agreement in force 2002 FTA with Slovenia
     Applied for EU membership in February 2003
FYR Macedonia 2003 ATMs September 2000 FTAs under the Stability Pact
    SAA, signed April 2001 FTAs with Turkey, Ukraine, EFTA
    Interim agreement in force June 2001  
Serbia and Montenegro accession requested 2001 ATMs September 2000 FTAs under the Stability Pact
    Working groups of experts to assess the FTAs with Hungary, Slovenia, Russia
    progress on reforms aiming at proposing  
    a SAA  
Bulgaria 1996 Europe Agreement, 31 December 1993 CEFTA, 1 January 1999, FTA with EFTA
    EU accession expected 2007 FTAs under the Stability Pact
      FTAs with Turkey
Cyprus 1963 Association Agreement (CU, 1 June1973)  
    EU accession Treaty signed April 2003  
Romania 1971 Europe Agreement, 1 May 1993 CEFTA, 1 July 1997, FTA with EFTA
    EU Accession expected 2007 FTAs under the Stability Pact
      FTAs with Moldova, Turkey
Slovenia 1994 Europe Agreement,1 January 1997 CEFTA, 1 January 1996, FTA with EFTA
    EU accession Treaty signed April 2003 FTAs with Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey
      Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Israel, Croatia
Turkey 1951 Association Agreement (CU, 1 January 1996) FTAs with EFTA, Israel, Romania, Hungary,
      Estonia, Czech Rep., Slovak Rep., Bulgaria,
      Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, FYR Macedonia
      Lithuania
Greece 1950 EU accession 1 January 1981  
    EMU member, 1 January 2002  
ATMs: Autonomous Trade Measures;  CU: Customs Union; FTA: Free Trade Agreement; SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement;
CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Agreement
Source: World Trade Organization data bases, www.wto.org, European Commission (2003)30
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); EBRD (2003); IMF
The World Economic Outlook Database (2003)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL =
Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey





















Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002)31























Share of  exports to  EU (%) Share of  exports to SEE (%) Share of  exports to ROW (%)
Note: Greece is included in the EU group and it is not included in the SEE group
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); IMF Direction of Trade (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL =
Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey,
ROW = the rest of the world






















Share of  imports from EU (%) Share of  imports from SEE (%) Share of  imports from ROW (%)
Note: Greece is included in the EU group and it is not included in the SEE group
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); IMF Direction of Trade (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL =
Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey,
ROW = the rest of the world32













AL HR FYROM SM BG CY RO SI TR EL
Resource intensive Labour intensive Capital intensive
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL =
Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenero, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = TurkeyTable 9: Export performance and specialization in South - East Europe, 2001
Country Share in Share RCA RCA Country Share in Share RCA RCA
national in world Rank national in world Rank
export % market % export % market %
Albania Bulgaria
Leather products 32.00 0.14 24.62 2 Basic manufactures 23.00 0.20 3.11 14
Clothing 36.00 0.06 10.86 16 Clothing 16.00 0.32 4.91 26
Wood products 3.00 0.01 1.04 55 Leather products 4.00 0.19 2.80 27
Basic manufactures 7.00 0.00 0.93 61 Chemicals 12.00 0.07 1.08 30
Miscellaneous manufacturing 4.00 0.00 0.48 68 Non-electronic machinery 6.00 0.04 0.61 33
Bosnia and Herzegovina Cyprus
Leather products 9.00 0.12 7.06 7 Chemicals 20.00 0.01 1.80 9
Wood products 17.00 0.09 5.37 9 Processed food 16.00 0.03 3.90 24
Basic manufactures 24.00 0.05 3.27 11 Miscellaneous manufacturing 8.00 0.01 0.99 32
Textiles 4.00 0.03 1.56 27 Leather products 2.00 0.01 1.28 47
Miscellaneous manufacturing 9.00 0.02 1.12 27 Clothing 8.00 0.02 2.38 48
Croatia Romania
Transport equipment 17.00 0.11 1.32 16 Leather products 9.00 1.53 7.24 6
Leather products 4.00 0.28 3.24 22 Basic manufactures 14.00 0.37 1.82 22
Wood products 6.00 0.17 2.03 34 Clothing 25.00 1.48 7.36 22
Chemicals 11.00 0.08 0.95 36 Non-electronic machinery 6.00 0.12 0.59 35
Clothing 11.00 0.26 3.16 38 IT & Consumer electronics 4.00 0.07 0.36 36
FRY Macedonia Slovenia
Basic manufactures 29.00 0.08 3.83 9 Miscellaneous manufacturing 14.00 0.29 1.74 8
Clothing 28.00 0.17 8.41 20 Non-electronic machinery 11.00 0.17 1.02 18
Leather products 3.00 0.06 2.68 28 Electronic components 11.00 0.20 1.22 19
Textiles 3.00 0.03 1.26 33 Chemicals 14.00 0.20 1.24 21
Processed food 9.00 0.04 2.21 44 Basic manufactures 14.00 0.30 1.82 23
Serbia and Montenegro Turkey
Basic manufactures 29.00 0.09 3.84 8 Textiles 13.00 2.75 4.94 5
Chemicals 15.00 0.03 1.31 19 Basic manufactures 15.00 1.11 2.02 20
Leather products 4.00 0.07 3.01 23 Clothing 21.00 3.56 6.44 23
Processed food 14.00 0.08 3.48 27 Transport equipment 10.00 0.44 0.79 29
Wood products 6.00 0.04 1.89 36 IT & Consumer electronics 3.00 0.18 0.32 38
Greece
Source: International Trade Center Basic manufactures 15.00 0.35 2.06 19
             www.intracen.org Processed food 14.00 0.56 3.28 29
Textiles 4.00 0.27 1.54 29
Clothing 14.00 0.71 4.11 32
Chemicals 10.00 0.15 0.89 3934
Table 10: Rankings and values of the UNCTAD inward FDI Performance Index
and Inward FDI Potential Index, South-East Europe, 1998-2000
Inward FDI
Performance Index Inward FDI Potential Index
       
Value Rank Value Rank
Albania 0.6 81 0.207 100
Croatia 1.7 27 0.343 46
FYROM 0.9 66 0.25 86
Bulgaria 1.8 24 0.321 53
Cyprus 0.4 102 0.414 34
Romania 1 57 0.248 87
Slovenia 0.3 110 0.429 31
Turkey 0.1 123 0.275 72
Greece 0.1 125 0.414 35
Hungary 1.1 49 0.274 42
          Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002)35























Per capita FDI inflows 2001, US dollars
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human
Development Report (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece,
FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, SEE = South-
East Europe36
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNCTAD Handbook of
Statistics (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece,
FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, SEE = South-
East Europe37
Chart 15: Voice and Accountability and Per - capita Inward FDI Stock in South - East Europe
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002);
Kaufmann et al (2002) Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL =
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Chart 16: Regulatory Quality and Per Capita Inward FDI Stock in South - East Europe
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human
Development Report (2002); Kaufmann et al (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR


































































Chart 17:Control of Corruption and Per Capita Inward FDI Stock in South - East Europe, 2001
Source: Authors' calculations based from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002);
Kaufmann et al (2002)
Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR
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